Electronically Filed
9/24/2018 4:58 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idaho.gov
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RICHARD P. SWALLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 45490
Boise County Case No.
CR-2016-59

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Swalley failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of 25 years, with 10 years fixed, upon his guilty plea to lewd
conduct with a minor under sixteen, or by relinquishing jurisdiction?

Swalley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
Swalley pled guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of 25 years, with 10 years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R.,
pp.104-08.)

Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished
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jurisdiction and executed Swalley’s underlying sentence. (R., pp.113-17.) Swalley filed a notice
of appeal timely from the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction. (R., pp.118-21.)
Swalley asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his mental health issues, status as a
first-time felon, and difficult childhood. (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.) The record supports the
sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
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prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum sentence for lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen is life
imprisonment. I.C. § 18-1508. The district court imposed a unified sentence of 25 years, with
10 years fixed, which falls well within the statutory guidelines. (R., pp.113-17.) Furthermore,
Swalley’s sentence is appropriate in light of the seriousness of the offense and his failure to
accept full responsibility for his actions.
Swalley’s biological daughter disclosed that Swalley had been engaging in sexual contact
with her for over a period of about two years, beginning when she was 13 years old. (PSI, pp.35. 1) According to the victim, the abuse began when Swalley discovered her looking at internet
pornography; at that time, Swalley “cautioned” the victim “she could cause a virus to be
introduced into his computer” and, under the guise of “avoid[ing] computer problems,” he
showed her “safer porn sights and they began watching pornography together.” (PSI, pp.3-5.)
The victim reported that their sexual interactions included kissing, fondling, manual/genital
contact, oral sex, genital/genital contact, and vaginal sexual intercourse and that these
interactions occurred approximately “thirty (30) to fifty (50) times.”

(PSI, p.3.)

When

questioned by police, Swalley initially denied having engaged in any inappropriate conduct with
the victim; however, he eventually admitted to “sexually interacting with his daughter five (5) or
six (6) times.” (PSI, p.3.) Swalley later told the presentence investigator that he had “a cloudy
memory of events,” that he “was not sure how ‘everything’ started,” and that he “did not
remember things that happened between he and [the victim].” (PSI, p.6.)
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Volume I –
PSI.pdf”
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The state acknowledges that Swalley does have mental health issues and has been
diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, PTSD, and personality disorder. (Psych. Eval., p.8.)
However, Dr. Arnold, who administered the psychological evaluation, noted Swalley’s failure to
be compliant with prior treatment, stating, “In the past, he [Swalley] has not been compliant with
or felt the need for psychotropical medication or therapy, and as such, supervision and
monitoring for compliance seems essential in promoting stable functioning.” (Psych. Eval., p.9.)
Swalley’s mental health issues and his failure to maintain treatment of those mental health issues
do not outweigh the seriousness of the offense or the need for society to be protected from him.
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Swalley’s sentence including the seriousness
of the offense, Swalley’s failure to take full responsibility for his actions, and the need for further
evaluation. (10/13/16 Tr., p.53, L.9 – p.58, L.10.) The state submits that Swalley has failed to
establish an abuse of discretion, for reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the
sentencing hearing transcript, which the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
Swalley next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing
jurisdiction in light his “successful rider” and low risk to re-offend. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)
Swalley has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
“Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court.” I.C. § 19-2601(4). The
decision to place a defendant on probation or whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the
defendant is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned
on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 889, 303 P.3d 241,
248 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981); State v.
Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205–06, 786 P.2d 594, 596–97 (Ct.App.1990)). A court's decision to
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relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of discretion if the trial court has sufficient
information to determine that a suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under
I.C. § 19-2521. State v. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013); Hansen, 154
Idaho at 889, 303 P.3d at 248 (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292
(2001)). “While a recommendation from corrections officials who supervised the defendant
[during the period of retained jurisdiction] may influence a court's decision, it is purely advisory
and is in no way binding upon the court.” State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438, 258 P.3d 950, 958
(Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648, 962 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1998); State
v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615, 798 P.2d 458, 460 (Ct.App.1990)). Likewise, an offender’s
“[g]ood performance while on retained jurisdiction, though commendable, does not alone
establish an abuse of discretion in the district judge's decision not to grant probation.” Hurst,
151 Idaho at 438, 258 P.3d at 958 (citing State v. Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137, 30 P.3d 290, 292
(2001)).
The district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction was appropriate in light of the
seriousness of the offense and Swalley’s minimization of his conduct. The state acknowledges
that Swalley completed his programming during the period of retained jurisdiction and that NICI
staff recommended the court consider placing him

on probation.

(APSI, pp.307, 310.)

However, at the time of sentencing, the district court specifically admonished Swalley that it was
retaining jurisdiction “for evaluation purposes only”:
I – in ordering the period of retain jurisdiction, I make no promise to you
that you’ll be released after the period of retain jurisdiction.
In fact, I want you to understand that this is for evaluation purposes only.
But I want to be better informed before I make the final decision in your case.
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(10/13/16 Tr., p.56, Ls.11-16.)

In its order relinquishing jurisdiction the district court

acknowledged Swalley’s performance in the retained jurisdiction program, NICI’s probation
recommendation, and what it considered Swalley’s “favorable traits,” including his lack of prior
criminal history and the psychosexual evaluator’s opinion that he “presented a low risk of
engaging in unlawful sexual behavior in the future.” (APSI, p.115.) There were “other facts”
that weighed against placing Swalley on probation, however, including that “[a] suspended
sentence and probation [would] depreciate the seriousness of Mr. Swalley’s wrongful conduct
with his daughter,” and that “[i]mprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrence
to the defendant for his very serious crime.”

(R., p.115 (citing I.C. § 19-2521(1)(c)(d)).)

Ultimately, the court concluded that “[t]his is a case where the seriousness of the defendant’s
crime and appropriate punishment are paramount and overriding considerations.” (R., pp.11516.) Given any reasonable view of the facts, Swalley has failed to establish that the district court
abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Swalley’s conviction and sentence and
the district court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.

DATED this 24th day of September, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming___________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

ALICIA HYMAS
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 24th day of September, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming__________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

7

APPENDIX A

1

THE COURT :

Go ahead, sir.

2

THE DEFENDANT :

I know that what I did was wrong

3

and it ' s taken me a while to realize it .

4

say i s I ' m sorry to my family , to the Court .

5

THE COURT :

6

Mr . Chastain , are you aware of any reason why

7

All right , sir .

And all I can

Thank you .

the Court cannot pronounce a sentence?

8

MR . CHASTAIN :

9

THE COURT :

There is none , Your Honor.

Mr. Swalley , on your guilty plea to

10

this felony charge of l ewd and lascivious conduct with a

11

minor child , I find , sir , that you are gu ilty .

12

This case arose because your daughter made

13

admissions of inappropriate sexual contact between you

14

and your daugh t er to a friend at schoo l .

15

This was reported to schoo l authori t ies , and

16

that required intervention by law enforcement .

17

enforcement went out to the school , immediately concluded

18

that there was a serious issue of your conduct .

19

soon after that , they contacted you.

20

And l aw

And very

In t he readi ng of these pol ic e repor t materials

21

of the police initial contact with you which, as I recall

22

is the day after the incident was reported at the school ,

23

you admitted the improper sexua l contact .

24
25

You stated it occurred at a frequency that was
much less than was reported by your daughter .

11
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You asked

1

if this could simply go away if you stopped doing it .

2

That wasn ' t an option.

But you were fully aware

3

and made admi ssions and offered to stop if that would

4

help .
I mention these thi ngs for t his reason .

5

In the

6

psycho - sexua l evaluation with Dr . Sombke , and again in

7

the mental health evaluation with Dr . Arnold , you profess

8

that you had no recall of your conduct ; that you weren ' t

9

denying t hat you did it , but you just didn ' t remember i t ;

10

and if your daughter said you did it , yeah , you probably

11

did it .

12

I ' m very troubled t hat you could have made these

13

admissions to t he pol ice on the day t ha t you were

14

initially confronted and that much later you claim to

15

have no memory of these thi ngs .

16

for me to reconcile .

17

That is very d i fficu l t

Another difficulty that I have , Mr . Swalley, is

18

this .

Dr . Sombke advises that you are a low risk to

19

r eoffend .

20

that to your conduct in th i s case .

21

concerned about that , becaus e you ' re relatively a young

22

man .

And I ' m having a difficult time reconciling

What are you , 38 now?

23

THE DEFENDANT :

24

THE COURT :

25

39?

And I -- I'm

38?

Yes , Your Honor .

From my perspect ive , you're a

relatively young man , Mr . Swa l ley, with a lot of life in

12
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1

2

front of you .
And I ' m conce r ned about potent i al fo r future

3

victimization .

4

doesn't -- it ' s hard for me to reconcile that with the

5

low risk to reoffend and your conduct in this case and

6

now that you don ' t remember anything that you did .

7

I ' m concerned about a report that

I d i d read the mental health evaluation .

It ' s

8

clear that you ' ve had a lot of issues over the course of

9

your lifetime ; that you struggled in school , you

10

struggled in life , and you have a number of mental health

11

diagnoses that I thin k play some role in the sentencing.

12

But at t he end of the day, the primary function

13

of the sentencing judge is to protect the public .

14

do my level best to do that .

15

And I

On your guilty plea to this felony charge of

16

lewd and lascivious conduct , I will sentence you to the

17

custody of the state board of corrections for a term of

18

25 years consisting of ten years fixed fo l lowed by 15

19

years indeterminate .

20

For evaluation purposes only , I'm going to

21

r eta i n jurisdiction .

22

troubled by this psychos exual evaluation that somehow

23

concludes that you are a low risk to reoffend .

24

satisfied that that ' s necessarily accurate .

25

As I ' ve indicated , I'm very

I ' m not

I ' m not a Ph . D. and I don ' t writ e forensic

13

Page 55

APPENDIX A – Page 3

1

psychological evaluations .

2

qualifications .

3

I don ' t have the

Mr . Chastain is correct , the department of

4

corrections has instituted essentia lly al l new treatment

5

and programming at every institution , and it has a

6

sex-offender part o f that program .

7

I rea ll y want to have essential ly another

8

evaluation by the department of corrections in terms of

9

your risk presentation , because I ' m uncomfortable with

10
11

the risk presen tation as I ' m l ooking at it .
I -- in ordering the period of retain

12

j urisdiction , I make no promise t o you that you ' ll be

13

released after the period of r etain jurisdiction .

14

In fact , I want you to understand that this is

15

for eva l uation purposes only .

16

i nformed before I make the f i nal decision in your case .

17

But I want to be bet ter

I will order that you pay all those court costs

18

and statutory assessments that are authorized by law .

19

I ' m not going to order a f ine i n your case .

20

I wi l l order reimbursement for the services of

21

your appointed counsel in the amount of $1 , 000 .

22

calcu lat e and give you credit for the time t hat you have

23

served prior to today 's sentencing .

24
25

We wi ll

I wi l l make it a condition of your judgment of
convi ction that you have no contact with your children

14
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1

and any minor under the -- any minor female under the age

2

of 18 .

3

to enforce that throughout any sentence that you may

4

serve .

5

6

And I will request the department of corrections

State have any questions about the Court ' s
disposition?

7

MR . PITTMAN :

8

THE COURT :

9

MR . CHASTAIN :

10
11
12

THE COURT :

No , Your Honor .

Thank you .

Mr . Chastain?
No, Your Honor .

Mr . Swalley , you have the right to

appeal this judgment and its terms.
You have 42 days from the written entry of this

13

judgment to file that appeal .

14

entitled to be represented by an attorney .

15

afford an attorney , one will be appointed for you at

16

State expense.

17

that appeal will be paid for by the State .

18

In that appeal you ' re
If you cannot

If you are a needy person, the costs of

At this point you're going to be transferred

19

from the jail facility to a faci l ity within the

20

department of corrections that is called the receiving

21

and diagnostics unit .

22

It is in that unit that t he department of

23

corrections will determine where you will be placed .

24

I hope they will follow my recommendation , they place you

25

in sex - offender treatment on the rider program .

15
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And

1

When the department of corrections concludes

2

that you have completed the programming or otherwise

3

should be sent back to the Court , you wi l l be returned to

4

this Court for final disposition with some sort of

5

recommendation .

6

I wish to emphasize that I make no promise that

7

I will follow any recommendation of the department , sir .

8

I just want to have more information about these risk

9

factors that I am unsettled about as I ' m sitting here for

10
11
12

sentencing .
Do you have any questions about the Court ' s
sentence , sir?

13

THE DEFENDANT :

14

THE COURT :

15

No , Your Honor .

All right .

That ' s the judgment .

That ' s the order of the Court .

16

17

(End of proceedings . )

18

19
20

21
22
23
24
25

16
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